Considerations on the Pleading for Judicial Reorganization of Firms in Brazil by Machado, Caio Vieira & Ferreira, André Bastos
 –231 – 
International Journal of Insolvency Law 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php/IJIL 
CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PLEADING 
FOR JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION OF 
FIRMS IN BRAZIL 
by André B. L. FERREIRA, lawyer, founding partner at 
Dourado, Ferreira, Lemos e Teixeira Advogados, researcher at 
the NAP-DISA USP, law graduate from the University of São 
Paulo; and, Caio C. V. MACHADO, lawyer, collaborator at 
IMODEV, law graduate from the University of São Paulo and 
Master of Laws from Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. 
 
 
n situations of crisis, the decision-making process behind 
pleading a judicial reorganization often involves contra 
balancing a complex array of elements, where issues may 
range from legal and normative to accounting and financial 
matters. Especially in such a context, in which companies and 
individuals are amidst adversities, various other underlying factors 
may weigh into the choices made by agents responsible for taking 
action. 
In order to comprehend the subject of this study, it is opportune 
to establish the following essential premise: the prospect of 
pursuing a judicial reorganization is exclusively intended for 
viable businesses, whose preservation would ultimately benefit 
society. This concept substantiates itself upon the notion that 
collective insolvency proceedings predominantly seek to 
harmonize the rights of creditors and of the debtor, instead of 
encouraging egotistic and disordered confrontation. Thus, the 
subjacent rationale consists is the substitution of individualistic 
negotiation in favor of solutions that promote, with the greatest 
possible means, the collective interest. 
On this matter, the regulation provided in Law No. 11,101 of 
February 2005 (Reorganization and Bankruptcy Act or “LRF”) 
brings about considerable social impact, setting the standards and 
scope of norms applicable towards both liquidation and the 
reorganization of firms. Suitably, the recognition of the social 
functions fulfilled by firms and the collective advantages of their 
preservation are deeply embodied in the LRF (Section 47, of the 
LRF)1, revealing the conciliatory nature of the legislation before 
all interests prejudiced by a company’s breakdown. 
The ideal realization of such principles would be permitting 
failing firms to resume their activities regularly in the market, 
                                                
1 “Art. 47. A recuperação judicial tem por objetivo viabilizar a superação da situação de crise 
econômico-financeira do devedor, a fim de permitir a manutenção da fonte produtora, do emprego dos 
trabalhadores e dos interesses dos credores, promovendo, assim, a preservação da empresa, sua função 
social e o estímulo à atividade econômica. ” 
I 
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provided they have demonstrated the potential to do so. 
Otherwise, the systems’ preferred alternative for irrecoverable 
businesses is bankruptcy, liquidating assets to attend to the 
interests of creditors. Contrary to a nearsighted understanding, a 
consistent application of the LRF may perfectly well ensue the 
extinction of certain debtors, in case such alternative satisfies 
social interest more adequately2. 
Once granted by the judiciary, the commencement of a judicial 
reorganization admits only limited possibilities of posterior 
abandonment3. Consequently, if a debtor effectively determines 
to initiate the proceeding, it will remain obliged to persevere until 
conclusion, risking facing a coercive conversion into bankruptcy 
in the case of failure to approve a recovery plan (Section 73 of the 
LRF4).  
In view of the briefly commented circumstances, it is perceivable 
that there is a strategic relevance to the interval immediately 
preceding judicial reorganizations, as well as their pleading phases, 
being potentially decisive to the future survival of businesses. 
Hence, given their social and legal implications, the following 
considerations will specifically address the application procedures 
for judicial reorganizations.  
To approach the subject, we propose to review the procedural 
requirements, conditions and information necessary for 
petitioning judicial reorganizations in Brazil, as well as the main 
criteria and consequences of decisions that grant or deny their 
commencement. Posteriorly, assessments will be made on the 
system currently in place, according to national and international 
standards and legal conditions.   
§ 1 – PROCEDURAL CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS 
Albeit the presence of academic controversy on the topic, judicial 
reorganizations consist in legal remedies that operate via judiciary, 
and therefore must be petitioned before a judge. In so doing, as 
                                                
2 N. LUCCA, “Abuso do Direito de Voto de Credor na Assembleia Geral de Credores 
Prevista nos Arts. 35 a 46 da Lei 11.101/2005”, Temas de Direito Societário e Empresarial 
Contemporâneos, M. VIEIRA (dir.), ADAMEK, Malheiros, São Paulo, 2011, p. 658: “Mais 
que nunca tom a-se imperiosa a noção de equilíbrio entre, de um lado, favorecer a manutenção da 
unidade produtiva, aceitando-se como naturais os revezes empresariais, e, de outro, proporcionar aos 
mutuantes a provável satisfação de seus créditos, de maneira tal que os conduza a sempre recolocá-los em 
circulação em benefício de toda a coletividade.” 
3 Once the judicial reorganization has been granted, the debtor cannot withdraw his 
plea for judicial reogranization, unless the approval of the General Assembly of 
Creditors is obtained, as determined by Section 52, Pragraph 4, of the LRF: “O devedor 
não poderá desistir do pedido de recuperação judicial após o deferimento de seu processamento, salvo se 
obtiver aprovação da desistência na assembleia-geral de credores.” 
4  “Art. 73. O juiz decretará a falência durante o processo de recuperação judicial: I – por deliberação 
da assembléia-geral de credores, na forma do art. 42 desta Lei; II – pela não apresentação, pelo 
devedor, do plano de recuperação no prazo do art. 53 desta Lei; III – quando houver sido rejeitado o 
plano de recuperação, nos termos do § 4o do art. 56 desta Lei; IV – por descumprimento de qualquer 
obrigação assumida no plano de recuperação, na forma do § 1o do art. 61 desta Lei. 
Parágrafo único. O disposto neste artigo não impede a decretação da falência por inadimplemento de 
obrigação não sujeita à recuperação judicial, nos termos dos incisos I ou II do caput  do art. 94 desta 
Lei, ou por prática de ato previsto no inciso III do caput  do art. 94 desta Lei. ” 
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any exercise of ones subjective right of action, it is required to 
adhere to general procedural conditions established in Law No. 
13,105 of March 2015 (Code of Civil Procedure or “CPC”), as 
well as acknowledging the special requirements provided in the 
LRF. 
As general conditions for the existence and validity of any legal 
procedural lien, interest in the claim and legal standing to plea are 
requisites for the reorganization proceeding (Section 17 of the 
CPC5); if not fulfilled, the petition will be immediately denied by 
court (Section 330, subsections II and III, of the CPC6). 
As outlined above, the factual grounds that establish interest in 
the claim for a judicial reorganization is the economic and 
financial crisis of the debtor; absent such condition, there is no 
legitimate motive to act. According to Mauro RODRIGUES 
PENTEADO, this situation is characterized by either insolvency 
(insufficient liquid assets to honor all due and outstanding 
obligations) and/or insolvability (existence of more assets than 
liabilities, but without liquid means to honor isolated 
obligations)7. 
This requirement of legal standing to plea cedes way to greater 
contention, given that the debtor (individual entrepreneur or 
firm) holds exclusive legitimacy to petition its reorganization 
(Sections 1 and 48 of the LRF8). The legal treatment conferred to 
bankruptcy proceedings, however, concedes legal standing to 
other relevant agents to take initiatives, namely creditors amongst 
them (Section 97 of the LRF9). 
According to Law No. 10,406 of January 2002 (Civil Code or 
“CC”), the deliberation to plead judicial reorganization in LLCs is 
restrictive to quota holders (Section 1,071, subsection VII, of the 
CC, by analogy). Exceptionally, the proceeding may be petitioned 
without previous consent of all partners, if authorized by holders 
of the majority of the voting capital stock. 
In Corporations, Section 122, subsection IX, of Law No. 6,404 of 
December 1976 (Corporations Act or “LSA”10) requires the 
authority of the General Assembly to authorize administrators to 
request the firm’s judicial reorganization. Similarly, as in LLCs, in 
case of urgency, the paragraph of Section 122 allows the petition 
to be filed without consultation of the assembly, so long as 
                                                
5 “Art. 17.  Para postular em juízo é necessário ter interesse e legitimidade.” 
6 “Art. 330.  A petição inicial será indeferida quando: ” “II - a parte for manifestamente ilegítima; 
III - o autor carecer de interesse processual; ” 
7 M. R. PENTEADO, “Capítulo I:  Disposições preliminares”, Comentários à Lei de 
Recuperação de Empresas e Falência: Lei 11.101/2005, F. SATIRO DE SOUZA JUNIOR, A. S. A. 
DE MORAES PITOMBO (dir.), 2nd ed, RT, São Paulo, 2007, p. 77 
8 “Art. 1o Esta Lei disciplina a recuperação judicial, a recuperação extrajudicial e a falência do 
empresário e da sociedade empresária, doravante referidos simplesmente como devedor. ” and “Art. 48. 
Poderá requerer recuperação judicial o devedor que, no momento do pedido, exerça regularmente suas 
atividades há mais de 2 (dois) anos e que atenda aos seguintes requisitos, cumulativamente: ”. 
9 “Art. 97. Podem requerer a falência do devedor: I – o próprio devedor, na forma do disposto nos arts. 
105 a 107 desta Lei; II – o cônjuge sobrevivente, qualquer herdeiro do devedor ou o inventariante; III 
– o cotista ou o acionista do devedor na forma da lei ou do ato constitutivo da sociedade; IV – 
qualquer credor. ” 
10 “Art. 122.  Compete privativamente à assembleia geral: IX - autorizar os administradores a 
confessar falência e pedir concordata. ” 
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authorized by the controlling stakeholder11. In the cases of firms 
with administrative councils, their summoning is mandatory in 
order to sanction the reorganization application carried out 
without approval of the general assembly12. 
In terms of prerequisites, the debtor must exercise entrepreneurial 
activity regularly for at least two years (Section 48 of the LRF). 
Moreover, it should cumulatively respect the following legal 
requirements: not be bankrupt and, if he or she ever was 
bankrupt, have a declaration of res judicata of any outstanding 
responsibilities (Section 48, subsection I, of the LRF13). In 
addition, he or she must not have partaken in judicial 
reorganizations during the past five years, (Section 48, 
Subsections II and III, of the LRF14). Finally, the recovering firm 
must not have been condemned or have an administrator or 
partner that has been condemned for collective insolvency crimes 
(Section 48, Subsection IV, of the LRF15). 
§ 2 – INFORMATION 
As in all economically relevant positions, informational 
asymmetry is the source of dangerous disequilibria between the 
various parties that participate in judicial reorganization 
proceedings. Consequently, with the intent of levelling out 
conditions of negotiation, legislators carefully laid out the 
information that must instruct petitions, in Section 51 of the 
LRF16. Debtor transparency is crucial to ensure the 
trustworthiness and integrity of the procedure; and the evasion, 
omission or provision of false information all constitute in 
criminal offenses established in Section 171 of the LRF17. 
The law requires the debtor to clarify the causes and reasons for 
its financial crisis (Section 51, Subsection I, of the LRF18), 
demanding precise and specific explanations19. The greater the 
                                                
11 “Parágrafo único. Em caso de urgência, a confissão de falência ou o pedido de concordata poderá ser 
formulado pelos administradores, com a concordância do acionista controlador, se houver, convocando-se 
imediatamente a assembleia-geral, para manifestar-se sobre a matéria. ” 
12 . S. C. N. CEREZETTI, A Recuperação Judicial de Sociedade por Ações, Malheiros, São Paulo, 
2012, p. 246. 
13 “I – Não ser falido e, se o foi, estejam declaradas extintas, por sentença transitada em julgado, as 
responsabilidades daí decorrentes; ”. 
14 “II – Não ter, há menos de 5 (cinco) anos, obtido concessão de recuperação judicial”; and “III - não 
ter, há menos de 5 (cinco) anos, obtido concessão de recuperação judicial com base no plano especial de 
que trata a Seção V deste Capítulo; “ 
15 “ IV – Não ter sido condenado ou não ter, como administrador ou sócio controlador, pessoa 
condenada por qualquer dos crimes previstos nesta Lei. ”. 
16 R. SZTAJN, “Capítulo III:  Da Recuperação Judicial” Comentários à Lei de Recuperação de 
Empresas e Falência: Lei 11.101/2005, F. SATIRO DE SOUZA JUNIOR, A. S. A. DE MORAES 
PITOMBO (dir.), 2nd ed, RT, São Paulo, 2007, p. 247. 
17 “Art. 171. Sonegar ou omitir informações ou prestar informações falsas no processo de falência, de 
recuperação judicial ou de recuperação extrajudicial, com o fim de induzir a erro o juiz, o Ministério 
Público, os credores, a assembleia-geral de credores, o Comitê ou o administrador judicial: Pena – 
reclusão, de 2 (dois) a 4 (quatro) anos, e multa. ”. 
18 “Art. 51. A petição inicial de recuperação judicial será instruída com:  I – a exposição das causas 
concretas da situação patrimonial do devedor e das razões da crise econômico-financeira; ”. 
19 F. A. M. SIMIONATO, Tratado de Direito Falimentar, Forense, Rio de Janeiro, 2008, p. 
156. 
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accuracy and celerity of the diagnostic, the better are the chances 
of weathering the storm, facilitating the determination of concrete 
and adequate measures to resolve existing difficulties. 
Next, the debtor is required to present its current accounts 
(Section 51, Subsection II, of the LRF20), aiming to signal the true 
financial status of the firm to creditors and the judiciary, allowing 
an analysis of the risks to credit and the soundness of the 
recovery plan to be negotiated. In the same manner, up-to-date 
account and financial application balances disclose all cash 
currently available (Section 51, Subsection VII, of the LRF21). 
It is necessary to nominally indicate all creditors of the recovering 
firm (Section 51, Subsection III, of the LRF22), along with the 
information needed for the elaboration of the definitive roster of 
creditors. It is also indispensable to provide an up-to-date list of 
all employees, allowing for an evaluation of labor-related liability 
(Section 51, Subsection IV, of the LRF23). 
In order to attest the current and past notarial standing of the 
debtor, including for purposes of verifying the procedural 
prerequisites, certificates of regularity in the public ledger of 
firms, up-to-date social contracts, and records of nomination of 
current administrators must be submitted before the judge 
(Section 51, Subsection V, of the LRF24). 
Provoking scholar dissent, Section 51, Subsection VI, of the LRF 
determines that a list of personal assets of the debtor’s controlling 
stakeholders and administrators must accompany the petition.25 
Although the sum of interests involved in reorganizations must 
be entertained, the personal prerogatives of the individuals 
affected by these invasive impositions cannot be ignored. 
Notwithstanding the rights of stakeholders and administrators 
not overtaking the collective good, such guarantees benefit from 
inalienable constitutional status. Therefore, the critique amounts 
precisely to the disproportionate harm caused to the right to 
privacy, established in Section 5, Subsection X, of the Federal 
Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil (“CRFB”)26. 
                                                
20 Micro-enterprises and small firms can present simplified accounting books, according 
to Section 51, Paragraph 2 of the LRF “Com relação à exigência prevista no inciso II do caput 
deste artigo, as microempresas e empresas de pequeno porte poderão apresentar livros e escrituração 
contábil simplificados nos termos da legislação específica. ” 
21 “VII – os extratos atualizados das contas bancárias do devedor e de suas eventuais aplicações 
financeiras de qualquer modalidade, inclusive em fundos de investimento ou em bolsas de valores, 
emitidos pelas respectivas instituições financeiras; ”. 
22 “III – a relação nominal completa dos credores, inclusive aqueles por obrigação de fazer ou de dar, 
com a indicação do endereço de cada um, a natureza, a classificação e o valor atualizado do crédito, 
discriminando sua origem, o regime dos respectivos vencimentos e a indicação dos registros contábeis de 
cada transação pendente; “. 
23 “IV – a relação integral dos empregados, em que constem as respectivas funções, salários, 
indenizações e outras parcelas a que têm direito, com o correspondente mês de competência, e a 
discriminação dos valores pendentes de pagamento; “. 
24 “V – Certidão de regularidade do devedor no Registro Público de Empresas, o ato constitutivo 
atualizado e as atas de nomeação dos atuais administradores; “. 
25 “VI – a relação dos bens particulares dos sócios controladores e dos administradores do devedor; “. 
26 “X - São invioláveis a intimidade, a vida privada, a honra e a imagem das pessoas, assegurado o 
direito a indenização pelo dano material ou moral decorrente de sua violação; “. 
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On the other hand, access to information on quota or 
shareholders and administrators can significantly contribute to the 
success of reorganization proceedings, quantifying the extent of 
personal assets for constituting new collaterals and facilitating the 
detection and liability for the commitment of abuses27. 
Within view of the difficulties and doubtful morality in coercively 
disclosing private information, it would be incoherent to withhold 
the commencement of reorganizations pending upon the 
voluntary waiving of individual rights by the affected parties28. 
Thus, occasionally, such information is substituted by 
declarations of the exercise of right to privacy by the concerned 
rights holders29.  
Legislation obliges the inclusion of attestations from the Protest 
Offices (Section 51, Subsection VIII, of the LRF30), to 
demonstrate the debtor’s unpunctuality in satisfying his 
obligations, as well as a list of actions in which he is part (Section 
51, Subsection IX, of the LRF31). 
In this regard, Rachel SZTAJN indicates that the phrasing of 
subsection IX is unclear as to whether only litigation in which the 
firm is a defendant should be indicated32. It seems adequate to 
hold the interpretation that all actions in which the debtor is party 
should be reported, offering a broader vision on the firm’s 
situation. 
§ 3 – GRANTING THE PROCESSING OF THE JUDICIAL 
REORGANIZATION 
In the prior legal regime in effect, a simple petition would suffice 
for the claimant to benefit from significant immunities, reality 
which nicknamed the national mechanism as a “legal favor”. 
Regarding current judicial reorganization, there is significant 
change in the functioning of the system, which postponed all 
substantial effects to after the proceeding has been granted by 
court, requiring the satisfaction of stricter conditions. Presently, 
the simple filing of a reorganization petition does not result in 
significant legal effects33. 
Reflecting the importance of these decisions, while pondering to 
grant the processing of a reorganization proceeding, magistrates 
possess as main guidelines the previously mentioned conditions, 
requirements and information, oriented by the general finality of 
enabling the recovery of firms, as established in Section 47. 
                                                
27 Op. Cit., R. SZTAJN, Capítulo III:  Da Recuperação Judicial, p. 254. 
28 The First Draft of the Work Group of the MF Decree No. 467/16 suggested 
revoking the requirement for the provision of the list of assets by the controlling share 
and quota holders and administrators. 
29 Op. Cit., F. A. M. SIMIONATO, Tratado de Direito Falimentar, p. 161. 
30 “VIII – certidões dos cartórios de protestos situados na comarca do domicílio ou sede do devedor e 
naquelas onde possui filial; “. 
31 “IX – a relação, subscrita pelo devedor, de todas as ações judiciais em que este figure como parte, 
inclusive as de natureza trabalhista, com a estimativa dos respectivos valores demandados. “. 
32 Op. Cit., R. SZTAJN, Capítulo III:  Da Recuperação Judicial, p. 255. 
33 Op. Cit., F. A. M. SIMIONATO, Tratado de Direito Falimentar, p. 167.  
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The most notable amongst the effects of admitting such a request 
is the suspension of legal actions held against the recovering firm 
(Section 52, Subsection III, of the LRF34) for the “non-
extendable” stay period of 180 days. 
Moreover, this decision follows the nomination of a trustee 
(Section 52, Subsection I, of the LRF35); the discharge of the 
obligation for the debtor who continues with its activities to 
provide debt clearance certificate, except when signing contracts 
with the State or to receive credit or tax benefits or incentives 
(Section 52, Subsection II, of the LRF36); and the publication of a 
notice indicating the name of all its creditors, indicating all 
up-to-date debts and the classification of each credit, along with 
the notice for delays for the proof of claims, and delay for 
creditors to present a objections to the plan of judicial recovery 
presented by the debtor (Section 52, Paragraph 1, of the LRF37). 
At first glance, the caption of Section 52, interpreted through a 
grammatical approach, seems to bind the magistrate’s admission 
of the initiation of the proceeding to the sole presence of the 
required information: “If all documentations required in Section 51 of the 
Law are provided, the judge shall grant the procedure of judicial recovery”. In 
other words, if all documents are made available, the judge is 
obliged to allow the proceeding to initiate, resulting in the 
aforementioned legal consequences. 
This interpretation, though supported by respectable doctrine and 
jurisprudence38, is losing support in national courts39. The 
claimant, when requesting judicial reorganization, does not act 
                                                
34 “III – ordenará a suspensão de todas as ações ou execuções contra o devedor, na forma do art. 6o 
desta Lei, permanecendo os respectivos autos no juízo onde se processam, ressalvadas as ações previstas 
nos §§ 1o, 2o e 7o do art. 6o desta Lei e as relativas a créditos excetuados na forma dos §§ 3o e 4o do 
art. 49 desta Lei; ”. 
35 “I – Nomeará o administrador judicial, observado o disposto no art. 21 desta Lei; “. 
36 “II – Determinará a dispensa da apresentação de certidões negativas para que o devedor exerça suas 
atividades, exceto para contratação com o Poder Público ou para recebimento de benefícios ou incentivos 
fiscais ou creditícios, observando o disposto no art. 69 desta Lei; “. 
37 “§ 1o O juiz ordenará a expedição de edital, para publicação no órgão oficial, que conterá: I – o 
resumo do pedido do devedor e da decisão que defere o processamento da recuperação judicial; II – a 
relação nominal de credores, em que se discrimine o valor atualizado e a classificação de cada crédito; III 
– a advertência acerca dos prazos para habilitação dos créditos, na forma do art. 7o, § 1o, desta Lei, e 
para que os credores apresentem objeção ao plano de recuperação judicial apresentado pelo devedor nos 
termos do art. 55 desta Lei. “. 
38 Brazil, TJSP APELAÇÃO CÍVEL 604.813.4/2009, Câmara Especial de Falências e 
Recuperações Judiciais, Relator Des. Elliot Akel, j. 17/12/2008: “A questão apreciada diz 
respeito aos limites da cognição permitida ao juiz, na sistemática da Lei n° 11.101/05, no exame 
inicial do pedido de recuperação judicial: "o juiz deferirá o processamento da recuperação judicial (...) O 
processamento da recuperação judicial é determinado tão-só pelo cumprimento dos requisitos formais 
para tanto previstos em lei, sem apreciação do eventual direito da devedora ao benefício pleiteado. ” 
39 Brazil, TJSP AI 0194436-42.2012.8.26.0000, 1ª Câmara Reservada de Direito 
Empresarial, Relator Des. Teixeira Leite, j. 02/09/2012: “Ausentes elementos mínimos a 
confiar na capacidade de recuperação da empresa agravante, motivo que resultou na determinação de 
uma perícia prévia, a ser elaborada por profissional qualificado, cuja finalidade é apenas e tão somente 
averiguar uma situação fática essencial ao processamento, mostra-se razoável e proporcional aos efeitos 
que irradiarão do deferimento”; and Brazil, TJSP, AI 0103311-56.2013.8.26.0000, 1ª Câmara 
Reservada de Direito Empresarial, Relator Des. Pereira Calças, j. 25/11/2014: “A Lei nº 
11.101/05 não estipulou percentual mínimo como critério objetivo para aprovação de plano de 
recuperação, permitindo aos credores, a seu critério, aprovarem ou rejeitarem, como participantes do 
mercado e de acordo com seus interesses, as propostas apresentadas pelos devedores. (...) parece-me 
descabida a possibilidade de o Poder Judiciário anuir com proposta que economicamente pode gerar a 
ruína de outros participantes do mercado”. 
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exclusively in its private domain; contrarily, it is immersed into 
the realm of the State’s judicial provisions. 
In this manner, whilst admitting the initiation of a judicial 
reorganization (as well as in other crucial moments of the 
procedure, such as the decision on the referendum of the 
recovery plan adopted by the General Assembly of Creditors40), 
the judge exercises power over formal and material legality of 
proceedings as well as the merit of the reorganization41. It would 
be contradictory to suppose that the examination of the 
recovering firms claim could occur strictly on a formality basis, 
within a mechanism of a predominantly judicial nature. 
Given that only viable companies may seek out judicial 
reorganizations, minimal demonstrations of the feasibility of their 
recovery is imperative in order to grant the initiation of the 
procedure, otherwise condoning the potentially useless or abusive 
utilization of reorganization pleas, with detrimental effects to 
creditors42. 
If exorbitant, however, such governance may result in 
non-requested State intervention in the domain of parties’ 
waivable property rights, unilaterally foreordaining the 
reorganizations’ outcome, and possibly contradicting interests of 
creditors and debtor alike. By replacing parties’ will in 
predetermining the convenience and opportunity of authorizing 
the proceedings, the judiciary threatens to give rise to non-legally 
oriented decision on such matters.  
In this regard, American and French regulations abide significant 
power to magistrates throughout proceedings43. Section 52 of the 
LRF seems to recommend moderation towards the invasive 
conduct of the judiciary, indicating that, when judging the pleas 
for the installment of reorganizations, the State should minimize 
interventions. 
                                                
40 Brazil, TJ-SP AI 2016148-33.2015.8.26.0000, 2ª Câmara Reservada de Direito 
Empresarial, Rel. Des. Carlos Alberto Garbi, j. 29/06/2015: "cabendo ao Magistrado 
examinar não só a legalidade do plano e de seus aditivos, como também a viabilidade do quanto 
decidido pela Assembleia Geral dos Credores, em respeito principalmente aos princípios contratuais e 
empresariais de ordem pública." 
41 J. LOBO and, P.F.C.S DE TOLEDO and C. H. ABRÃO (dir.), Comentários à Lei de 
Recuperação de Empresas e Falência, Saraiva, São Paulo, 2005, p. 154: “ O juízo da ação de 
recuperação judicial deve exercer, sempre, necessária e obrigatoriam ente: (I a) o controle da legalidade 
formal, quando examinará questões, por exemplo, como: (a) legitimidade ativa (arts. Ia e 47); (b) 
preenchimento dos requisitos do art. 48; (c) atendimento das exigências sobre convocação, instalação e 
deliberação da assembleia geral de credores (art. 36 a 45); (d) observância das formalidades legais 
referentes à publicação de editais; e, outrossim, (2a) o controle de legalidade material ou substancial, em 
que verificará se houve, p o r exemplo: (a) fraude à lei ou abuso de direito, quer p o r p a rte do devedor, 
quer dos credores, (b) acordos contrários à lei, à m oral, aos bons costumes, à boa-fé objetiva, ao 
interesse público etc. Incumbe-lhe, ademais, dependendo do caso concreto exercer controle de mérito, tanto 
do plano de recuperação quanto da decisão da assembleia geral de credores, com o, por exemplo, quando: 
(a) a deliberação for por maioria e os dissidentes hajam deduzido objeções e votos divergentes; (b) a 
deliberação for contrária à aprovação do plano e o devedor haja apresentado defesa e postulado a 
anulação do conclave por fraude à lei, abuso de direito, preterição de formalidade essencial etc.” 
42 Brazil, TJSP AI 2058626-90.2014.8.26.0000, 1ª Câmara Reservada de Direito 
Empresarial, Relator Des. Teixeira Leite, j. 03/07/2014: “Empresa com inviabilidade 
econômica não pode ter o pedido de processamento deferido, sob pena de ao invés de se proteger uma 
empresa da quebra, passa a inverter a ordem dos fatores, deferindo-se a benesse em casos de total 
inviabilidade, com prejuízo na recuperação dos créditos. Restou mantida, pois, a r. decisão. ”. 
43 Op. Cit., F. A. M. SIMIONATO,  Tratado de Direito Falimentar, p. 164. 
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§ 4 – CONSIDERATIONS 
According to the National Institute of Enterprise Reorganization 
in Brazil (INRE), since the coming into effect of the LRF until 
June 9, 2015, 6,938 reorganizations were petitioned in the 
country. The average duration of collective insolvency 
proceedings ranges from six to ten years, with devaluations of 
approximately 50 to 60% of debts being claimed, varying 
according to plans approved by General Assemblies of Creditors. 
Although indicators demonstrate progress in comparison to prior 
systems, they also revealed that the number of firms that have 
successfully concluded reorganization proceedings and resumed 
normal operations are as few as 5%.44 
Practitioners have observed that petitioning for reorganizations is 
often procrastinated, consequently reducing the possibility of 
success in restructuring the activities of failing firms.45 The 
motives that bring entrepreneurs to postpone taking such 
measures are difficult to identify, and companies ultimately empty 
their cash reserves and aggravate their patrimonial situation in the 
meantime. 
An influential cultural stigma suffocates the phenomena of 
reorganization and bankruptcy. Such institutions, oftentimes held 
as degrading, consist merely in legal instruments conceived to 
attenuate the effects brought upon by the materialization of risks 
inherent to any economic activity. The recognition of such 
contingencies as inexorable elements of market-based enterprises 
is fundamental to fortify entrepreneurial drive, leaving behind the 
inculpation executives for the eventual dysfunction of businesses.   
Corporate governance structures also suffer considerable pressure 
from such endogenous factors, affecting the capability of 
deliberative and administrative organisms to efficiently make 
decisions and execute important measures.  If corporate 
institutions lose capacity and dynamism to act pragmatically and 
sensibly, the existence of diverse conflicting interests within firms 
(controlling stakeholders, minority stakeholders, boards of 
directors, executive officers, employees, creditors etc.) could 
impede the approval of structural actions, such as the plea for a 
reorganization.   
The exorbitant costs and bureaucracies associated with the 
conduction of a reorganization also offer barriers to the 
accessibility of the mechanism to many firms. The lack of 
                                                
44 CONSULTOR JURÍDICO, “Em 10 anos, quase 7 mil empresas entraram em recuperação 
judicial no Brasil”, Conjur, 2015, Available at http://www.conjur.com.br/2015-jun-
13/empresas-entram-recuperacao-judicial-reabilitam, last accessed on June 20, 2017. 
45
 “Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems”, 
The World Bank, 2001, p. 30: “Access to the law should be convenient, inexpensive and 
quick. Overly restrictive access can deter debtors, smothering the commercial need. 
Delay can result in insolvent corporations that should clearly be liquidated, otherwise 
being left uncontrolled with a likely dissipation or waste of assets. Delay can also cause 
insolvent but viable businesses to wither on the vine. Accordingly, careful consideration 
must be given to how the law frames the criteria required to satisfy the test for 
insolvency when an enterprise voluntarily submits to the process and where an 
involuntary petition is brought by creditors.” 
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structure and low degree of professionalism in the corporate 
milieu may delay the application for a reorganization. The 
irregularity or disorganization of corporate documents are factors 
that occasionally render a swift initiation of proceedings 
unpractical, in view of the plethora of lawfully required 
conditions.  
Because of this, the LRF rightfully provides the possibility for 
micro and small businesses to present simplified bookkeeping. 
Conformably, the Work Group recently assembled by the 
Ministry of Finance to propose modifications to the LRF suggests 
the reduction of the legal requirements on firms to be liable for 
reorganization. As an example, the new proposed content of 
Section 48 of the LRF would be reduced to the following text: 
“Any debtor that is not currently bankrupt, at the moment of application, is 
eligible for a reorganization, even if his activities have been temporarily 
ceased.”46 
Additionally, the exclusive legal standing of debtors to plea 
reorganizations is an essential matter. Considering the 
characteristics of the proceeding, many authors defend greater 
control to remaining parties interested in the uplift of firms, 
better reconciling such interests: “The application stage of the judicial 
reorganization should already contain a reflex of the principle, and attempt to 
embrace all interested parties in the best manner possible. The restriction of 
the legal standing, as foreseen in the Bankruptcy Law, does not appear to 
uphold such postulate.”47 
In this sense, international organizations have suggested the 
amplification of the legal standing currently in effect in the 
Brazilian legal system (not on occasion, exalting arguments in 
favor of creditors’ rights). The World Bank, in its “Principles and 
Guidelines” on the matter, suggests that creditors accumulate the 
prerogative to plea for the involuntary reorganization of their 
debtors: “Creditor rights are a fundamental concern of bankruptcy law, and 
an insolvency system should enable creditors to petition for commencement of 
proceedings.”48  
With a similar perception, while also contemplating the 
heterogeneous systems in place, the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) asserts: “Although 
insolvency laws generally provide for liquidation proceedings to be initiated by 
either a creditor or a debtor, there is no consensus as to whether reorganization 
proceedings can also be initiated by a creditor. As noted above, a number of 
laws include provision only for debtor applications. Given that one of the 
objectives of reorganization proceedings is to enhance the value of assets and 
thereby increase the return to creditors on their claims through the continued 
                                                
46 First Draft of the Work Group of the MF Decree No. 467/16, Section 48: “Poderá 
requerer recuperação judicial o devedor que não estiver falido-, no momento do pedido, ainda que tenha 
cessado temporariamente suas atividades. ”  
47 Op. Cit., S. C. N. CEREZETTI, A Recuperação Judicial de Sociedade por Ações, p. 250: “A fase 
postulatória da recuperação judicial já deveria conter em si um reflexo do princípio e buscar abranger da 
melhor maneira possível os interessados. A restrição da legitimidade ativa, tal qual contida na Lei de 
Recuperação e Falência, não parece ir ao encontro desse postulado. ” 
48 “Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems”, 
The World Bank, 2001, p. 30. 
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operation and reorganization of the debtor’s business, it is highly desirable 
that the ability to apply not be given exclusively to the debtor. A further 
reason for allowing creditor applications is that there will be cases where the 
debtor will not or cannot apply for commencement because, for example, 
management has resigned.”49 
From a comparative law standpoint, the legal system of the 
United States of America currently admits that judicial 
reorganization be initiated by one of two distinctive means: (i) o 
Voluntary Petition, in which the debtor discretionarily pleas for the 
proceedings; and (ii) Involuntary Petition, in which creditors propose 
the installment of the proceeding. In the latter case, grounded 
suspicion regarding the debtor’s integrity or lack of capability to 
conduct his business is required, and a legal provision is present 
to assure indemnification for damages potentially provoked by 
pleading the proceedings in bad faith.50  
French, German and Portuguese legislation also legitimates 
creditors to file for reorganizations of debtors, under legally 
determined circumstances. In France and Portugal, 
reorganizations can also be commenced directly by the judiciary, 
or upon request by the competent District Attorney’s office. 
Seemingly, such systems are more open to the participation of 
other agents, that, when aware of difficulties faced by businesses, 
possess legal grounds to intervene, despite the will of the debtor 
to do so.51 
CONCLUSION 
After reviewing the procedural requirements, conditions and 
necessary information for pleading judicial reorganizations, many 
obstacles that currently present themselves for firms in distress 
that wish to initiate proceedings have surfaced. Achieving the 
objective of facilitating access to this important legal mechanism 
is essential to society, allowing businesses to resume their 
activities successfully in the market, resulting in greater welfare 
for their respective communities. 
The judiciary’s decision to grant the commencement of the 
proceeding, with all corresponding legal entailments, currently 
poses a dire tradeoff. On one hand, unrestrictedly allowing the 
initiation of reorganizations may provoke significant impairment 
towards the exercise of legitimate rights by creditors, and, on the 
other, submitting debtors to complex and meticulous filters and 
requirements could potentially condemn reorganization 
procedures before they are allowed a fighting chance.    
Scholars persistently recommend forms of amplifying firms’ 
access to collective insolvency proceedings, simplifying requisites 
and removing unnecessary bureaucracy. The possibility of 
                                                
49 “Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part Two: Core Provisions for an Effective 
and Efficient Insolvency Law”, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), 2005, p. 68. 
50 Op. Cit., S. C. N. CEREZETTI, A Recuperação Judicial de Sociedade por Ações, p. 257. 
51 Op. Cit., S. C. N. CEREZETTI, A Recuperação Judicial de Sociedade por Ações, p. 266. 
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augmenting the participation of other interested parties, thereby 
granting legal standing to plead reorganizations on behalf of 
debtors (or even to propose reorganization plans), no doubt is 
among the discussed possibilities. This course of action, although 
compatible with orientations supported by qualified international 
organizations, already present in most developed countries, 
requires careful consideration to verify its pertinence to the 
Brazilian context.  
National legislators must constantly monitor and strive to resolve 
practical difficulties faced by practitioners, procuring the 
concretization of the principles intended by insolvency law in 
general: to balance the interests impacted by crises, providing 
better outcomes for all of society.52 
                                                
52  Op. Cit. Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part Two: Core Provisions for an 
Effective and Efficient Insolvency Law”, United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL), 2005, p. 12: “Insolvency should be addressed and resolved in an orderly, quick 
and efficient manner, with a view to avoiding undue disruption to the business activities of the debtor 
and to minimizing the cost of the proceedings. Achieving timely and efficient administration will support 
the objective of maximizing asset value, while impartiality supports the goal of equitable treatment. The 
entire process needs to be carefully considered to ensure maximum efficiency without sacrificing flexibility. 
At the same time, it should be focused on the goal of liquidating non-viable and inefficient businesses 
and the survival of efficient, potentially viable businesses.”. 
